Three former shelter residents today have a home to call their own thanks to the efforts of the Delaware State Housing Authority (DSHA) and Dover Interfaith Mission for Housing (DIMH) which together celebrated the milestone of the 500th home assisted through the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) by opening DIMH’s first permanent supportive housing residence in Dover. This previously foreclosed and vacant home will provide stable housing for employed, income-qualified residents formerly housed at DIMH’s shelter.
Three ways that the burgeoning healthy afterschool movement can be a leader in incorporating social, emotional, and academic development, as explained by Daniel Hatcher.
Both the House and Senate ESEA bills keep annual tests, but they go very different ways on a lot of other assessment issues.
Three players from champions the Netherlands make the Under-17 EURO team of the tournament along with two each from runners-up Italy, hosts England and Spain.
Education Week asked three 8th grade teachers to evaluate real student responses to an open-ended question on the National Assessment of Educational Progress in social studies. Here's what they said.
Three Penn State Lehigh Valley students majoring in biobehavioral health and working in health care talked to us about the impact of COVID-19 at their jobs.
It may be a slow time for K-12 activity on Capitol Hill, but you can't really same the same about higher education, with competing bills vying for attention in the House and Senate.
Three Berks Thun Library employees received the 2020 Innovation in College Librarianship Award from the College Libraries Section of the Association of College & Research Libraries, a division of the American Library Association. The award honors librarians who demonstrate a capacity for innovation in working with or serving undergraduates or instructors in the areas of programs, services, and operations, or creating innovations for library colleagues that facilitate their ability to better serve the library’s community.
To better understand educational research, start by asking "who?" Who wrote the study; who published it; and who did the authors intend as their audience?
Three years after the launch of the M10, Leica is bringing a black-and-white Monochrom version to market, with an all-new 40MP imager and the classic M rangefinder design.
Three national educational funders explain a new program that is highlighting innovative practices in schools around the country.
Three teams of youngsters from the United States were given the chance to impress at the UEFA Champions Festival with a series of special exhibition matches in Munich.
Three-fourths of children across the United States aren't getting the recommended physical activity per week, according to a report card released this month by the National Physical Activity Plan Alliance.
Three high school basketball players in Tennessee were charged with aggravated rape and aggravated assault in late December after allegedly sending one of their 15-year-old teammates to the hospital.
Three Ga. high school seniors have been charged with aggravated sexual battery and consumption of alcohol by a minor stemming from an alleged sexual assault during a post-prom party.
Three new studies show that a web of factors appear to influence how often black and Hispanic children are identified for special education compared to similar white peers.
Three children are named after OM team members who have left an impact on one woman's life.
The needs of the world have become real to Luz Ángela Miranda in OM Panama's Intensive School of Missions.
Three men arrive home safely after walking 2000 kilometres to raise awareness about the 2000 languages still without the Bible.
Three ladies attend an OM Mexico meeting to pray for Mexican workers around the world. Little did they expect to be so blessed in return.
The Africa Trek ladies connect with local ladies in a village, who want to know more about Christ after watching the Jesus film.
A group of believers worshiping Jesus in public leads to the opportunity to share the Gospel with a young, religious Jew.
Three OM Hungary team members share what they’ve learned while serving as teachers at the International Christian School of Budapest.
KM Harris
Jul 1, 1992; 12:2685-2705
Articles
Three Oregon school employees sued their union in federal court last week, arguing it's unfair that the teachers' union only lets members drop out and stop paying dues during the month of September.
Three large oranges Six eggs 250g caster sugar 1 tsp baking powder 250g almond meal (ground almonds)
The Three Talk Model of shared decision is a framework to help clinicians to think about how to structure their consultation to ensure that shared decision making can most usefully take place. The model is based around 3 concepts - option talk, decision talk, and team talk - with active listening at the centre. Three Talk was first proposed in...
A brook runs through my Grandmas farm, That used to carry gold. My Grandpa -Benjamin- Did not yield the land, To the British, who wanted it dammed. In 1968, they took him in, To have his appendix removed, And Grandma never remarried. My Aunt Alice, Was a witch. She flew in on broomsticks We never […]
21 January 2020
Building on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus is a realistic and attainable goal.What does Britain’s departure from the EU mean for the country’s policy towards the South Caucasus, a small region on the periphery of Europe, fractured by conflict? Although Britain is not directly involved in any of the region’s peace processes (except in the case of the Geneva International Discussions on conflicts involving Georgia, as an EU member state), it has been a significant stakeholder in South Caucasian stability since the mid-1990s.
Most obviously, Britain has been the single largest foreign investor in Caspian oil and gas. Yet beyond pipelines, Britain also has been a significant investor in long-term civil society-led strategies to build peace in the South Caucasus.
Through what was then the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, in the early 2000s the Department for International Development (DfID) pioneered large-scale peacebuilding interventions, such as the Consortium Initiative, addressing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in 2003-09. These built civic networks in the South Caucasus and partnerships with British-based NGOs.
This experience left a strong intellectual legacy. British expertise on the South Caucasus, including specific expertise on its conflicts, is highly regarded in the region and across the world.
There is also a strong tradition of British scholarship on the Caucasus, and several British universities offer Caucasus-related courses. Through schemes such as the John Smith Fellowship Trust, the Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellowship at Chatham House and Chevening Scholarships, significant numbers of young leaders from the South Caucasus have spent time in British institutions and built effective relationships within them.
This niche as a champion of long-term, strategic peacebuilding and repository of area-specific knowledge should not be lost as Britain’s relationship with the EU and regional actors evolves. This can be ensured through awareness of three challenges confronting a post-Brexit Caucasus policy.
The first challenge for London is to avoid framing a regional policy in the South Caucasus as an extension of a wider ‘Russia policy’. Deteriorating Russian-British relations in recent years strengthen a tendency to view policies in the European neighbourhood through the traditional prisms of Cold War and Russian-Western rivalries.
Yet an overwhelming focus on Russia fails to capture other important aspects of political developments in South Caucasus conflicts. Although often referred to as ‘breakaway’ or ‘occupied’ territories, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh are not ungoverned spaces. They have evolved into examples of what scholars call ‘de facto states’ that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty.
Few disagree that these entities would not survive without external patronage. But neither does that patronage explain their sustainability on its own. Russia-centricity diminishes Britain’s latitude to engage on the full range of local drivers sustaining these entities, contributing instead to less effective policies predicated on competition and containment.
A second and related challenge is to maintain and develop Britain’s position on the issue of engaging populations in these entities. De facto states appear to stand outside of the international rules-based system. Yet in many cases, their civil societies are peopled by skilled and motivated activists who want their leaders to be held accountable according to international rules.
Strategies of isolation ignore these voices and contribute instead to fearful and demoralized communities less likely to engage in a transformation of adversarial relationships. Making this case with the wider international community, and facilitating the funding of local civil societies in contested territories, would be important steps in sustaining an effective British policy on the resolution of conflicts.
The third challenge for Britain is to maintain a long-term approach to the conflicts of the South Caucasus alongside potential short-term imperatives in other policy fields, as relationships shift post-Brexit.
In this fluid international environment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has a role to play both as an internal champion of a long-term peacebuilding strategy and a coordinator of British efforts with those of multilateral actors engaged in the South Caucasus. These include the United Nations, the EU’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia and OSCE’s Special Representative for the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, all of which have built relationships with relevant actors on the ground.
Britain’s niche as a champion and advocate of a strategic approach to peaceful change can be secured post-Brexit in the following ways.
First, in-house expertise is crucial to effective peacebuilding programming. The Foreign Office’s research analysts play a vital role in generating independent internal advice and liaising with academic and NGO communities. Their role could be supplemented by the reinstatement of a regional conflict adviser post, based in Tbilisi, tasked with strengthening Britain’s regional presence on conflict issues and coordinating policy at a regional level.
This post, with a remit to cover conflicts and build up area knowledge and relationships can contribute significantly to working closely with local civil societies, where so much expertise and knowledge resides, as well as other stakeholders.
Second, programming should build in conflict sensitivity by dissociating eligibility from contested political status. This can encourage local populations to take advantage of opportunities for funding, study, comparative learning and professional development irrespective of the status of the entity where they reside.
The Chevening Scholarships are an excellent example, whereby applicants can select ‘South Caucasus’ as their affiliated identity from a drop-down menu. This enables citizens from across the region to apply irrespective of the status of the territory in which they live.
Finally, a holistic understanding of peace is crucial. Programming in unrecognized or partially-recognized entities should acknowledge that effective peacebuilding needs to embrace political dynamics and processes beyond cross-conflict contact and confidence building. Local actors in such entities may find peacebuilding funding streams defined exclusively in terms of cross-conflict contact more politically risky and ineffective in addressing domestic blockages to peace.
While cross-conflict dynamics remain critical, ‘single-community’ programming framed in terms of civic participation, inclusion, civil society capacity-building, minority and human rights in contested territories, and building the confidence from within to engage in constructive dialogue, are no less important.
The ’global Britain’ promised by Brexit remains a fanciful idea. Quiet, painstaking work to build on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus, on the other hand, is a realistic and attainable goal.
28 November 2019
Lukashenka’s domestic support is waning and he is not willing to make concessions to the West. Instead, he is trying to appease the ruling cadre.Belarus’s parliamentary elections, held on 17 November, were predictably non-transparent, with numerous violations. The regime of Alexander Lukasheka allowed no opposition candidates as members of parliament – in contrast to the previous parliament, in which there were two opposition MPs. While this might seem to be a return to ‘business as usual’, three key takeaways from the elections highlight a shifting political and social landscape.
1. Lukashenka is appeasing his ruling cadre by promising to increase their role in the political system.
With several influential officials becoming new MPs, it is more likely that parliament will be more involved in any forthcoming discussion of a new constitution. Lukashenka has been promising constitutional reform for several years; he has said publicly that it will lead to an increased significance of government agencies as well as parliament. The aim of this is to keep them more engaged and on Lukashenka’s side.
In terms of the composition of the new parliament itself, there are some key differences with previous years. It is no longer a comfortable place for officials to while away their pre-retirement: many MPs are now in their fifties or younger, and have plans for careers beyond parliament.
It also looks as if small steps are being taken towards the emergence of a party system in Belarus. The leader of Belaya Rus, a pro-government association of Belarusian officials, got a seat in parliament for the first time, increasing the likelihood of it becoming a political party. The number of MPs from different parties has increased to 21 (out of 110 in total). Although these still all broadly support Lukashenka, they can differ from the president in policy positions. For example, the Labour and Justice Party, with 6 seats in parliament, supported the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Change, of course, may not necessarily be in a pro-Western direction.
Moreover, the newly elected members of parliament look more like real politicians. They go to debates, speak to independent journalists and have their own social media channels. Some have even felt able to criticize the actions of the authorities.
Similar changes have been taking place in other institutions in Belarus. The government is now more competent than it has ever been. The National Bank has managed to carry out macroeconomic stabilization on one of the most unstable currencies in Europe, while the ministries responsible for the economic development have implemented certain small-scale reforms. The Minister of the Interior has even acknowledged mistakes made by his department (under his predecessor), and undertaken to make improvements.
This has resulted in a near-comical situation, whereby the Belarusian non-state media outlets have an increasingly positive view of some state officials, such as Prime Minister Siarhei Rumas, while the state media has been scaling back its coverage of him to ensure he does not become too popular.
2. Belarus has less need for the West and is reluctant to make even small concessions.
Since the slight warming of Belarusian relations with the West in 2014, Lukashenka has been having more meetings with prominent Western officials. Western institutions began trying to cooperate more closely with Belarus, but soon saw that it was not very interested. In 2018, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development allocated €360 million to Belarus. However, it is now considering a reduction, as reforms in Belarus have not, in its view, gone far enough. The European Union has also committed considerable time and money to regional authorities, but this has not brought any significant changes to Belarusian local government.
The absence of opposition candidates also demonstrates that the Belarusian authorities are prepared for a new deterioration of relations with the West. The authorities could certainly have afforded some opposition in parliament, especially since they themselves choose whom to appoint. Given that they did not, they either do not consider worsened relations a problem or are confident that the West will continue to cooperate with Belarus in order to limit Russian power, regardless of its violations of the rule of law.
3. There is growing popular dissatisfaction with the current regime, but the state has no good plan for how to deal with it.
Parliamentary election campaigns in Belarus are traditionally low-key, but this year they were particularly muted. The authorities tried to ensure that people knew as little about the election as possible. Campaign posters appeared on the streets just two weeks before polling day. It seems the authorities were reluctant to politicize society, as further resentment at autocratic rule is brewing.
Many Belarusians who previously supported Lukashenka now have a very critical opinion of him. Take political blogging: the most popular political blogger in Belarus is a 22-year-old man who goes by the name of NEXTA. He produces low-quality videos which are highly critical of the authorities. A film by him about Lukashenka, released a month ago, has already received 1.8 million views, even though there are only 9.5 million people in Belarus.
The authorities are not in a concessionary mood. The presidential elections in 2020 will also likely be a sham. If the authorities’ grip over the country is weakened, they will fear an outbreak of anger, resulting in widespread protests which the regime might once again have to meet with violence.
21 January 2020
Building on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus is a realistic and attainable goal.What does Britain’s departure from the EU mean for the country’s policy towards the South Caucasus, a small region on the periphery of Europe, fractured by conflict? Although Britain is not directly involved in any of the region’s peace processes (except in the case of the Geneva International Discussions on conflicts involving Georgia, as an EU member state), it has been a significant stakeholder in South Caucasian stability since the mid-1990s.
Most obviously, Britain has been the single largest foreign investor in Caspian oil and gas. Yet beyond pipelines, Britain also has been a significant investor in long-term civil society-led strategies to build peace in the South Caucasus.
Through what was then the Global Conflict Prevention Pool, in the early 2000s the Department for International Development (DfID) pioneered large-scale peacebuilding interventions, such as the Consortium Initiative, addressing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, in 2003-09. These built civic networks in the South Caucasus and partnerships with British-based NGOs.
This experience left a strong intellectual legacy. British expertise on the South Caucasus, including specific expertise on its conflicts, is highly regarded in the region and across the world.
There is also a strong tradition of British scholarship on the Caucasus, and several British universities offer Caucasus-related courses. Through schemes such as the John Smith Fellowship Trust, the Robert Bosch Stiftung Academy Fellowship at Chatham House and Chevening Scholarships, significant numbers of young leaders from the South Caucasus have spent time in British institutions and built effective relationships within them.
This niche as a champion of long-term, strategic peacebuilding and repository of area-specific knowledge should not be lost as Britain’s relationship with the EU and regional actors evolves. This can be ensured through awareness of three challenges confronting a post-Brexit Caucasus policy.
The first challenge for London is to avoid framing a regional policy in the South Caucasus as an extension of a wider ‘Russia policy’. Deteriorating Russian-British relations in recent years strengthen a tendency to view policies in the European neighbourhood through the traditional prisms of Cold War and Russian-Western rivalries.
Yet an overwhelming focus on Russia fails to capture other important aspects of political developments in South Caucasus conflicts. Although often referred to as ‘breakaway’ or ‘occupied’ territories, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorny Karabakh are not ungoverned spaces. They have evolved into examples of what scholars call ‘de facto states’ that, to differing degrees, control territory, provide governance and exercise internal sovereignty.
Few disagree that these entities would not survive without external patronage. But neither does that patronage explain their sustainability on its own. Russia-centricity diminishes Britain’s latitude to engage on the full range of local drivers sustaining these entities, contributing instead to less effective policies predicated on competition and containment.
A second and related challenge is to maintain and develop Britain’s position on the issue of engaging populations in these entities. De facto states appear to stand outside of the international rules-based system. Yet in many cases, their civil societies are peopled by skilled and motivated activists who want their leaders to be held accountable according to international rules.
Strategies of isolation ignore these voices and contribute instead to fearful and demoralized communities less likely to engage in a transformation of adversarial relationships. Making this case with the wider international community, and facilitating the funding of local civil societies in contested territories, would be important steps in sustaining an effective British policy on the resolution of conflicts.
The third challenge for Britain is to maintain a long-term approach to the conflicts of the South Caucasus alongside potential short-term imperatives in other policy fields, as relationships shift post-Brexit.
In this fluid international environment, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has a role to play both as an internal champion of a long-term peacebuilding strategy and a coordinator of British efforts with those of multilateral actors engaged in the South Caucasus. These include the United Nations, the EU’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia and OSCE’s Special Representative for the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the South Caucasus, all of which have built relationships with relevant actors on the ground.
Britain’s niche as a champion and advocate of a strategic approach to peaceful change can be secured post-Brexit in the following ways.
First, in-house expertise is crucial to effective peacebuilding programming. The Foreign Office’s research analysts play a vital role in generating independent internal advice and liaising with academic and NGO communities. Their role could be supplemented by the reinstatement of a regional conflict adviser post, based in Tbilisi, tasked with strengthening Britain’s regional presence on conflict issues and coordinating policy at a regional level.
This post, with a remit to cover conflicts and build up area knowledge and relationships can contribute significantly to working closely with local civil societies, where so much expertise and knowledge resides, as well as other stakeholders.
Second, programming should build in conflict sensitivity by dissociating eligibility from contested political status. This can encourage local populations to take advantage of opportunities for funding, study, comparative learning and professional development irrespective of the status of the entity where they reside.
The Chevening Scholarships are an excellent example, whereby applicants can select ‘South Caucasus’ as their affiliated identity from a drop-down menu. This enables citizens from across the region to apply irrespective of the status of the territory in which they live.
Finally, a holistic understanding of peace is crucial. Programming in unrecognized or partially-recognized entities should acknowledge that effective peacebuilding needs to embrace political dynamics and processes beyond cross-conflict contact and confidence building. Local actors in such entities may find peacebuilding funding streams defined exclusively in terms of cross-conflict contact more politically risky and ineffective in addressing domestic blockages to peace.
While cross-conflict dynamics remain critical, ‘single-community’ programming framed in terms of civic participation, inclusion, civil society capacity-building, minority and human rights in contested territories, and building the confidence from within to engage in constructive dialogue, are no less important.
The ’global Britain’ promised by Brexit remains a fanciful idea. Quiet, painstaking work to build on the legacies of a long-term British investment in a peace strategy for the South Caucasus, on the other hand, is a realistic and attainable goal.
28 November 2019
Lukashenka’s domestic support is waning and he is not willing to make concessions to the West. Instead, he is trying to appease the ruling cadre.Belarus’s parliamentary elections, held on 17 November, were predictably non-transparent, with numerous violations. The regime of Alexander Lukasheka allowed no opposition candidates as members of parliament – in contrast to the previous parliament, in which there were two opposition MPs. While this might seem to be a return to ‘business as usual’, three key takeaways from the elections highlight a shifting political and social landscape.
1. Lukashenka is appeasing his ruling cadre by promising to increase their role in the political system.
With several influential officials becoming new MPs, it is more likely that parliament will be more involved in any forthcoming discussion of a new constitution. Lukashenka has been promising constitutional reform for several years; he has said publicly that it will lead to an increased significance of government agencies as well as parliament. The aim of this is to keep them more engaged and on Lukashenka’s side.
In terms of the composition of the new parliament itself, there are some key differences with previous years. It is no longer a comfortable place for officials to while away their pre-retirement: many MPs are now in their fifties or younger, and have plans for careers beyond parliament.
It also looks as if small steps are being taken towards the emergence of a party system in Belarus. The leader of Belaya Rus, a pro-government association of Belarusian officials, got a seat in parliament for the first time, increasing the likelihood of it becoming a political party. The number of MPs from different parties has increased to 21 (out of 110 in total). Although these still all broadly support Lukashenka, they can differ from the president in policy positions. For example, the Labour and Justice Party, with 6 seats in parliament, supported the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Change, of course, may not necessarily be in a pro-Western direction.
Moreover, the newly elected members of parliament look more like real politicians. They go to debates, speak to independent journalists and have their own social media channels. Some have even felt able to criticize the actions of the authorities.
Similar changes have been taking place in other institutions in Belarus. The government is now more competent than it has ever been. The National Bank has managed to carry out macroeconomic stabilization on one of the most unstable currencies in Europe, while the ministries responsible for the economic development have implemented certain small-scale reforms. The Minister of the Interior has even acknowledged mistakes made by his department (under his predecessor), and undertaken to make improvements.
This has resulted in a near-comical situation, whereby the Belarusian non-state media outlets have an increasingly positive view of some state officials, such as Prime Minister Siarhei Rumas, while the state media has been scaling back its coverage of him to ensure he does not become too popular.
2. Belarus has less need for the West and is reluctant to make even small concessions.
Since the slight warming of Belarusian relations with the West in 2014, Lukashenka has been having more meetings with prominent Western officials. Western institutions began trying to cooperate more closely with Belarus, but soon saw that it was not very interested. In 2018, the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development allocated €360 million to Belarus. However, it is now considering a reduction, as reforms in Belarus have not, in its view, gone far enough. The European Union has also committed considerable time and money to regional authorities, but this has not brought any significant changes to Belarusian local government.
The absence of opposition candidates also demonstrates that the Belarusian authorities are prepared for a new deterioration of relations with the West. The authorities could certainly have afforded some opposition in parliament, especially since they themselves choose whom to appoint. Given that they did not, they either do not consider worsened relations a problem or are confident that the West will continue to cooperate with Belarus in order to limit Russian power, regardless of its violations of the rule of law.
3. There is growing popular dissatisfaction with the current regime, but the state has no good plan for how to deal with it.
Parliamentary election campaigns in Belarus are traditionally low-key, but this year they were particularly muted. The authorities tried to ensure that people knew as little about the election as possible. Campaign posters appeared on the streets just two weeks before polling day. It seems the authorities were reluctant to politicize society, as further resentment at autocratic rule is brewing.
Many Belarusians who previously supported Lukashenka now have a very critical opinion of him. Take political blogging: the most popular political blogger in Belarus is a 22-year-old man who goes by the name of NEXTA. He produces low-quality videos which are highly critical of the authorities. A film by him about Lukashenka, released a month ago, has already received 1.8 million views, even though there are only 9.5 million people in Belarus.
The authorities are not in a concessionary mood. The presidential elections in 2020 will also likely be a sham. If the authorities’ grip over the country is weakened, they will fear an outbreak of anger, resulting in widespread protests which the regime might once again have to meet with violence.
Extracytoplasmic sugar decoration of glycopolymer components of the bacterial cell wall contributes to their structural diversity. Typically, the molecular mechanism that underpins such a decoration process involves a three-component glycosylation system (TGS) represented by an undecaprenyl-phosphate (Und-P) sugar-activating glycosyltransferase (Und-P GT), a flippase, and a polytopic glycosyltransferase (PolM GT) dedicated to attaching sugar residues to a specific glycopolymer. Here, using bioinformatic analyses, CRISPR-assisted recombineering, structural analysis of cell wall–associated polysaccharides (CWPS) through MALDI-TOF MS and methylation analysis, we report on three such systems in the bacterium Lactococcus lactis. On the basis of sequence similarities, we first identified three gene pairs, csdAB, csdCD, and csdEF, each encoding an Und-P GT and a PolM GT, as potential TGS component candidates. Our experimental results show that csdAB and csdCD are involved in Glc side-chain addition on the CWPS components rhamnan and polysaccharide pellicle (PSP), respectively, whereas csdEF plays a role in galactosylation of lipoteichoic acid (LTA). We also identified a potential flippase encoded in the L. lactis genome (llnz_02975, cflA) and confirmed that it participates in the glycosylation of the three cell wall glycopolymers rhamnan, PSP, and LTA, thus indicating that its function is shared by the three TGSs. Finally, we observed that glucosylation of both rhamnan and PSP can increase resistance to bacteriophage predation and that LTA galactosylation alters L. lactis resistance to bacteriocin.
(University of Illinois Grainger College of Engineering) Three Nick Holonyak Jr., Micro and Nanotechnology Lab (HMNTL) faculty members received NSF Rapid Response Research (RAPID) program grants, all of which aim to shorten the amount of time it takes to process a COVID-19 test with less false negatives. Current tests can take as long as five days for results to be.
Xiaodong Cao, Bennett Chow and Yongjia Zhang
Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 148 (2020), 2595-2600.
Abstract, references and article information
Extracytoplasmic sugar decoration of glycopolymer components of the bacterial cell wall contributes to their structural diversity. Typically, the molecular mechanism that underpins such a decoration process involves a three-component glycosylation system (TGS) represented by an undecaprenyl-phosphate (Und-P) sugar-activating glycosyltransferase (Und-P GT), a flippase, and a polytopic glycosyltransferase (PolM GT) dedicated to attaching sugar residues to a specific glycopolymer. Here, using bioinformatic analyses, CRISPR-assisted recombineering, structural analysis of cell wall–associated polysaccharides (CWPS) through MALDI-TOF MS and methylation analysis, we report on three such systems in the bacterium Lactococcus lactis. On the basis of sequence similarities, we first identified three gene pairs, csdAB, csdCD, and csdEF, each encoding an Und-P GT and a PolM GT, as potential TGS component candidates. Our experimental results show that csdAB and csdCD are involved in Glc side-chain addition on the CWPS components rhamnan and polysaccharide pellicle (PSP), respectively, whereas csdEF plays a role in galactosylation of lipoteichoic acid (LTA). We also identified a potential flippase encoded in the L. lactis genome (llnz_02975, cflA) and confirmed that it participates in the glycosylation of the three cell wall glycopolymers rhamnan, PSP, and LTA, thus indicating that its function is shared by the three TGSs. Finally, we observed that glucosylation of both rhamnan and PSP can increase resistance to bacteriophage predation and that LTA galactosylation alters L. lactis resistance to bacteriocin.
Three months ago, Apple released a new credit card in partnership with Goldman Sachs that aimed to disrupt the highly regulated world of consumer finance. However, a well-known software developer tweeted that he was given 20x the credit line offered to his wife, despite the fact that they have been filing joint tax returns and […]
Are you dreaming of being your own boss someday, or would you like to bring in extra income? Starting an online business is one of the easiest ways to accomplish this. The biggest challenge of starting an online business can be developing your business plan. If you are struggling to come up with that brilliant […]
Three years ago it was barely walking. Now, Atlas, the humanoid robot from Boston Dynamics is performing gymnastic routines that mimic professional athletes.
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Oscar voting is ending and a few motion picture academy members are ready to share their picks.